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relativities under the Labour Relations Act 
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Walter ~Grills* 
The abolition of compulsory arbitration means that bargaining power will be essential 
,to achieve superior settlements. ~o.rkers will be attracted to stronger unions and there 
will be ,a change in union structure. The dismantling of the w.elfare state will .mean .that 
workers will come to depend on union bargaining power for protection. The objects of 
unions ,and .the subject matter of bargaining ,are no longe.r restricted, and the union can 
insist that the .employer p~ovide securi,ty which ·was forme.r,ly provided by the ,state. 
R~estructuring the union movement as promoted by ,the Labour RelationsAct will nat i~ 
the .long r.un lead to g~eater wage jl.exibility. Unions will remain occupationally based, 
and will be parties to occupational/y-bas.ed awards which do not accommodate the 
economic circumstances of individual industries or ,emp.loyers. There will be a smalle.r 
number of more powerful unions holding the national award structure together through 
bargaining power, rather .than by the force of the Arbitration Commission's re,asoning . 
Compulsory arbitration and the welfare state 
For a major part of the century New .Zealand has operated a compulsory 
arbitration/union membership syste·m. The basic desi.gn developed from the 1894 
Industrial Conciliation and Aibitration Act. The Act was part of a series of measures to 
regulate New Zealand industry and included the early Factories, Mines, and Shops and 
~Offices A·cts. The provisions of the compulsory arbitration system regulated the standards 
for minimum wages and conditions throughout the range of industries in New Zealand. 
Welfwe legislation ensured that .minimum standards of health, education and w.elfare were 
maintained. In a parallel way, the industrial relations system was a subsystem within the 
overall system which comprised the welfare state. Minimum standards of wages and 
conditions were guaranteed through a compulsory arbitration system. Y~et the union 
movement see.med curiously unaware of their dependence upon the regulations of the 
wei fare state. 
Following periods wher~e successive governments deemed it necessary for unions and 
employers to limit wage increases, or freeze wage negotiations, the union movement 
sought a "return to free ·wage bargaining". Free wage bargaining meant that unions should 
be free to drive home wage settlements by striking either in breach of the law or in breach 
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of the spirit of the law upon which the compulsory arbitration system was ~ounded. There 
was no 11ecipn>eity for e·mployers ·who remained yoked to the compulsory arbitration 
system, but in seeking freedom ~or the union movement to bargain without restriction, 
unions overlooked some of the logical accompaniments to free collective bargaining. If 
the union is free to bargain, so must the employer be free to bargain. If a union is free to 
strike over a collective agreement, it follows that the employer should also have unlimited 
freedom to bargain. The full range of freedoms include a freedom to refuse to go to 
arbitration, to refuse to ·enter into collective bargaining, to refuse to accept the union as a 
legitimate bargaining agent, to refuse the application of an industry-based award to the 
employers particular ~enterprise, and to refuse to bargain with or employ union labour. 
Th·e d~eregulation or the labour market 
In contrast to being part of a package to regulate industry, the Labour Relations Act is 
part of a package to deregulate New Zealand industry. A critical aspect of the Act is that 
compulsory arbitration is no longer provided for. The right to strike over new or renewed 
awards is enshrined in the new legislation. There is no longer direct legislative 
interv.ention into the bargaining arena. Unions are fr,ee to claim any quantum of wages, 
and any particular conditions of employment. But the unions ·Can no longer compel the 
employers to go to arbitration. Settlements depend on bargaining power. Bargaining 
power in tum depends on the state of the economy, and at present the balance is against 
the union movement. Weaker unions may shortly experience the bitter taste of "free 
collective bargaining" and regret the passing of the compulsory arbitration system. 
However, the Labour Relations Act only in part deregulates the labour market, and 
some conservative ideologues amongst employer .ranks are critical of the Act because it 
does not represent the full deregulation of the labour market. Compulsory unionism, 
union recognition and industry-wide bargaining :rights, which were all secured by the 
compulsory arbitration legislation., remain less secure, but nevertheless important features 
of the Labour Relations Act. However, deregulation, like free collective bargaining, is a 
te1u1 which is presently being used with a profound sense of confusion. It would be trite 
to recount the history of the monopoly and price-fixing on the pfoduct market, but it is 
necessary to remind free marketeers that monopoly is no less a goal of the players on the 
labour market. Governments intervene in labour markets because the natural object of the 
bargainers in the labour market is the same objective .as those on the product market -
market dominance and monopoly. The his~ory of the laissez-faire approach to the labour 
market .reveals that the tactics of employers and unions alike ~can be not only unfair, but 
applied with such single-minded, self-interested ferocity that national interest is placed in 
jeopardy. The balance of bargaining power will not always remain in the employers' 
favour., and an employer concern for regulating the labour market is likely to be reborn. 
Freedom to strike and wage relativity 
The central fiegulatory mechanism under the foaaner compulsory arbitration/union 
system was the prohibition of strikes and the requirement of ,arbitration. Strikes w~ere 
ill ~egal when a dispute of interest was being processed within the conciliation and 
arbitration procedures. Under lhe former Act disputes of right were to be determined by 
arbittation within disputes committees, and personal ,grievances against the employer 
(mainly unjustified dismissals) were settled within grievances committees. Strikes were 
also prohibited over issues which came within the jurisdiction of disputes and personal 
grievance procedures. The design of the compulsory arbitration system was based on the 
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assumption that industrial dispu~es were best decided by reason of the court rather than the 
bargaining power of the parties. 
Under the new Act, strikes over issues which fall within the jurisdiction of disputes 
committees and personal grievances remain illegal, but the Labour Relations Act 
incorporates the right to strike ov~er interest disputes. There are no prohibitions related to 
striking while disputes remain in conciliation council. Arbitration is no longer 
compulsory. The parties to a dispute of interest must agree to arbitration. The fo1 tner 
responsibilities of the Arbitration Court have been divided between a new Labour Court 
and Arbitration Commission. The Arbitration Commission has the voluntary arbitration 
function in relation to disputes of interest While consultation with the Commission is 
required, there are no prohibitions against striking while these consultation procedures are 
carried out. 'The Labour ~Court retains the intelpfetation and enforcement functions. 
A criticism of the former sys~em of compulsory arbitration is that awards were 
negotiared almost solely on the basis of intra-award felativities, and not on the basis of 'the 
industry's or company's capacity to pay. The te1n1 relativity has been used mainly to 
mean the historical relationship between k~ey award rates. Bargainers tended to trace the 
mathematical relationship ov~er past settlements between a key rate in one award and the 
k~ey rate in a comparison award. The rates of registered electricians were related to 
indentured fitters, indentured fitters to indentured ~carpenters, indentured carpenters to 
labourers and clerical workers, labourers to drivers, and drivers to storepersons. The 
rationale of bargainers w,as either to pass on the going rate, or concentrate on a specific 
parity with a comparison award. In recent years the going rate has generally been the 
major feature with some attention being paid to macroeconomic argument during the 
initial pace setting award negotiations. But once pfecedence has been set, economic 
arguments have had little effect on the viability of outcomes in negotiations. 
Compulsory arbitration was one aspect of the system which reinforced relativity. In 
contrast, the outcomes of collective bargaining within a deregulated industrial relations 
system are detenuined by bargaining pow,er. If the Distribution Workers Union has the 
power to bring comme11ce to a halt, then drivers can look forward to a more positive 
outcome than can the local body officers. Under the compulsory arbitration system the 
Local Body Officers Union had direct access to the Arbitration Co~ and either the ,Court 
historically enforced the going settlement rate, or employers conceded what they knew the 
Court would enforce. 
'The critical question raised by the Labour Relations Act is whether the bargainers will 
voluntarily continue to reflect in their settlements the overall sense that workers should be 
treated equally, at least in tettns of the minimum requirements of awards, or whether the 
economic fortunes of the individual worker shall be deteinained solely on the basis of 
bargaining power. Signals as to the futu~e behaviour of bargainers are mixed. In the last 
wage round, the first completed under the Act, two out of th£,ee settlements were reached 
between 7 and 8 percent. That statistic does not suggest that the Labour Relations Act 
has made any significant contribution to wage flexibility. The Metal Trades Award was 
initially settled at 7 percent, and Lhe vast majority of awards simply followed on without 
regard ~o variations in the individual industries' capacity to pay, or the individual 
bargaining strength of unions. 
As always there are different views on whether 7 pe!icent was too little, or too much. 
One view was that 7 percent was too much.. The economy has suffered more than Lhe 
United States economy had suffered during the middle 1970s. C,ertainly, the recent 
announcement that unemployment has inclieased by 20 percent over the year ending March 
1988 lends credence to this argument. Agreement between employers and unions exists 
that manufacturers are failing to compete on the domestic markets against the increasing 
cheap imports. The high dollar poses a barrier to exporters. These features were critical 
features of the u ·nited States economy when in the late 70's and early 80's a large number 
of United States labour negotiations ended in nil wage increases, or "give backs" by 
unions. There are alternative arguments that 7 percent may not have been excessive. 
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However, given the crippled state of various sectors of the economy, the unifonnity, if 
not magnitude, of settlements is astounding, particularly given the greater flexibility 
~either suffered or ~enjoyed in markets other than the labour market. Against this, however, 
there were a small number of settlements which revealed a potential for greater wage 
·flexibility. 
As a part of the ov~erall Metal Trades settlement the parties agreed that there would be a 
restructuring of 'the engineering industry negotiations. The structure of the General Metal 
Trades Award was derived from the amalgamation of a number of separate industry awards 
in the 1970s. The Metal Trades Award will be split back into sector awards. The 
prospect has also been put forward that these sector awards may be negotiated on a 
composite basis with other unions in the sectors joining in negotiations for a composite 
sector award. The idea presumably is to negotiate awards which are sensitiv~e to the 
economic needs of individual industries. It should be pointed out howev~er that this 
development is not because of the Labour Relations Act. Sector awards existed under the 
Industrial Relations Act prior to their amalgamation within the General Metal Trades 
Award. Provisions under composite negotiations also existed under that Act Hence, the 
:move has been at the initiative of the bargainers, not because of the requirements of the 
Act. 
While there have been a limited number of composite agreements read under the old 
Act, the composite provisions did not succeed in encouraging widespread composite 
bargaining. It is also uncertain that other unions will tak~e up the engineers lead and join 
in composite bargaining, or agree to sectorise their own awards. In contrast, the Hotel and 
Hospital Workers Unions sought to negotiate a New Zealand Health Services Award 
which fequi.fed amalgamating three awards which applied in public hospitals, private 
hospitals, and rest homes. While the unions were not successful, significant 
improvements for rest home workers were gained, and the National Health Workers Award 
is likely to remain on the union ~'s agenda during the next wage round. However, the 
objective will not be ~conceded easily by employers. Already private hospital employers 
have filed claims for a composite, private sector hospitals award citing both hospital 
workers and nurses. Evidently, e·mployers see a composite award providing some solution 
to demarcation problems between orderlies and nurses. 
If these industry sector initiatives do succeed, there may well be greater wag~e 
flexibility as the transport industry's settlement has revealed. The General Driv~er's Award 
has in the past brought tog~ether lh~ee major industry groups: general transport, contractors 
of heavy machinery in construction and ancillari~es to employers of drivers in 
.manufacturing and other industries where transport is not the principle objective. 'The 
perceived capacities to pay off these three industries have not always .run in tandem, and 
award negotiations were then characterised by one or more sectors of employers refusing 
wage increases which the remainder found acceptable. Nevertheless, the wisdom until last 
year's negotiations was to keep the three sector award intact. This year negotiations broke 
down, and three individual sector awards were settled. The contractors settled frrst with an 
8.6 percent increase plus a major adjustm~ent to the industry allowance. The union 
insisted this represented approximately a 14 pefcent increase on average for drivers in the 
contracting industry. The transport award was then settled on the same basis. But 
negotiations ov,er the ancillary award floundered. After protracted negotiations, part of the 
industry settled on 8.6 percent for wages and 8.6 percent for the industry allowance. 
R~elativity was broken between the ancillaries and general transport and contracting 'With 
the exception of the Northern Industrial District The Northern Drivers Union has refused 
to accept the settlement, and are pursuing the issue on a job to job basis. 
Employers were willing to deal with the unions on an industry sector basis, and the 
industry sectors had clearly perceived differences in their capacity to pay or their ability to 
withstand industrial disruption .. Drivers ~employed in the manufacturing sector, arguably 
the weakest sector, received J.ess. In terms of industrial strength driv,ers are far weaker in 
the ancillary section. Small numbers of drivers are employed by a diversity of ancillary 
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employers. These drivers are more difficult to organise, particularly in the manufacturing 
sector, and their employers are suffering under tbe present ~economic policies. 
Nevertheless, many drivers employed by ancillaries drive the same trucks and carry out 
substantially the same duties as drivers employed by ttansporters. 'The settlement 
illustrates a clear shift from the basis of settling the award on the principle of equity, to 
the principle of industrial power. Importantly to the rest of the wage round, the 1.4 
percent settlement was not accepted as a precedenl Under the compulsory arbittation 
system 'With the Court as a back up, experience was that the precedent would hav~e been 
followed throughout the remainder of the wage round. In fact the General Drivers Awanl 
was often placed early in the round because of the strategical advantages of the Drivers 
Union. The award was used as a pfecedent for the whole of the wage round. 'The drivers 
settlements may represent the first clear lesson about bargaining under the Labour 
Relations Act: unions with the power produce the results .. 
The subject m,att~er of collective bargaining 
'The importance of union organisation and bargaining power is further r~einforced by 
two alterations in the Act. Under the Industrial Relations Act the subject matter of 
bargaining was restticted by the definition of industrial matters. In conttast the Labour 
Relations Act does not define industrial matters. Similarly, the Industrial Relations A~ct 
restricted the objectiv~es of registered unions., but under the Labour Relations Act no such 
restrictions exist. Unions with bargaining power will not only provide for better 
seu.lements over the traditional subjects of collective bargaining, but the range of subjects 
has 'been increased. That is particularly important as the welfare state continues to be 
dismantled. Clearly, superannuation is a critical .item for the future bargaining agenda. 
Major alterations to National Superannuation appear to be inevitable fegardless of which 
party is in power. While rec~ent removal of tax incentiv,es may initially discourage 
employer supported superannuation, the union movement will provide a fresh incentiv~e. 
No doubt national negotiations will feature not only the power of industrial punches, but 
important philosophic debate as to whose responsibility the supplementation of 
superannuation should be. Similarly, with moves towards a greater reliance on private 
health car~e, employers will be asked to take responsibility f:or medical insurance. If North 
American patterns develop, then dental and legal insurance will also find 'their way to the 
bargaining agenda. 
The irony of ~course is that the philosophers of the deregulated market, who have so 
strongly insisted 'that New Zealand society would improve if the individual took 
r~esponsibility, ar~e going to be among those who are asked to pay, and their valid 
objections will be on fmancial, rather than philosophic grounds. The collective ~claims of 
the union mov~ement are no less a result of individual initiative and co-operation than are 
the corporate demands of a collection of shafeholders organised into a limited liability 
company,. Strong unions will insist that the employers assume the responsibilities shed 
by the state, and the end result of the privatisation of New h.aland for many employers 
will mean greater, not lesser labour costs. 
A second alternative is where the employer refuses to take over the former 
responsibilities of the State, but these responsibilities are assumed by a strong union. 
There is no longer within our labour legislation any prohibition against unions running 
their own superannuation, health, dental, and legal schemes, or for that matter operating 
their own businesses, or making substantial support provisions to assist individual 
workers' participation in industrial warfare. Where the union assumes these 
responsibilities, the .fesponsibilities will be funded from union dues. Under the Labour 
Relations Act there is no longer a limitation on what union dues may be required . Union 
dues are paid through wages, and wages in turn paid by employers who negotiate with 
powerful unions. 'The additional increment to cover the necessary increase in union dues 
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·will come out of the employers pocket. The unions' assumption of the former 
responsibilities of the State will cement the powerful loyalties of their membership. But 
in the final analysis it is the employer who will pay the price both in terms of the wage 
bill, and in loss of the worker's loyalty. 
Restructuring unions 
The third alternative, and a real alternative in many industries, is that a particular union 
will not have the bargaining power to succeed against employers. In a system whose 
results are generated purely by bargaining pow~er, outcomes will become increasingly 
conspicuous. The union dues will be considered a worthy investment where the union 
delivers. Where the union fails in its delivery its membership will become increasingly 
frustrated, and in search of altemativ~es. One alternative is a competing and more powerful 
union. In practical terms the compulsory arbitration/unionism system granted in 
peq>etuity exclusive bargaining rights tor workers which fell within their jurisdiction as 
detennined by their rules r~egistcred under the Act According to the free marketeers this 
has calcified a union structure which has been rendered by force of law incapable of 
changing with the times. This provided stability for the union's structure, and eliminated 
conflict in the work plaoe betw~een competing unions, but did not allow unions to 
compete for one another's membership. Such competition is no longer prohibited. 
Under the new legislation unions may compete for members, provided ·they follow a 
set of procedures. These procedur~es require that the union give notice to the Registtar of 
Industrial Unions, the central organisation of workers., and any unions affected by a 
proposed change in coverage. The notic.e is to be to the ~effect that within three ·months a 
union intends to apply to the Registrar of Unions for approval to include a new category 
or categories of workers within their union membership. Extension of the coverage is 
subject to two ballots. Firstly, the union must conduct a ballot of its own membership 
to detennine if there is support to extend the coverage. If support is received., then the 
Registrar is to conduct a ballot of workers to be covered by the extended coverage. If the 
members of the initiating union and the workers to be newly covered support the 
extension of coverage, in both ballots, then the Registrar of Unions amends the 
membership rule of the union to effect an extension of ~coverage. 
While these changes al1ow for competition between unions~ the new Act does not 
provide for the ultimate competition between the union and employers. The new Act re-
enacts a system of compulsory unionism. This system allows the union to negotiate 
union preference provisions requiring all employees to join the union within 14 days of 
being requested to do so by the union. Failing agreement to a preference provision, the 
issue is to be dete1 nained by ballot carried out by the Registrar of Industrial Unions. The 
ballot is carried out over all ~employees in the industry. The history of tpis arrangement 
for preference provisions has been that industry-wide settlements have depended upon 
employers conceding the preference provision., and employers have almost universally 
conceded. A variant of this arrangement was enacted under the previous government prior 
to their voluntary unionism enactment. This required balloting to deteunine union 
members' views as to whether the union should seek preference provisions. Universally, 
majorities of workers supported preference provisions. 
Under the compulsory arbitration/unionism system union members of different unions 
received a remarkably unifonn reward for union membership. That may no longer be the 
case, and an increasing support for voluntary unionism amongst the membership of 
weaker unions is likely to result because these unions may be unable to deliver. 
Individual employers complain that the system does not allow them to compete for the 
hearts and minds of their own employees, and imposes a labour monopoly upon their 
industry. A sense of employee's genuine frustration with paying union dues to a union 
that cannot deliver may pro:mpt employer negotiators to oppose the incorporation of a 
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union membership requirement in the award. Voluntary unionism under the previous 
National Government was perceived by many employers as a brief but succ~essful 
experiment. An election of the present opposition party will mean a return to voluntary 
unionism, and there are those who predict voluntary unionism to be the outcome of the 
present split between the political and industrial arms of the labour party. Voluntary 
unionism will mean that weaker unions may wither in some industries. But under a 
system where unions may compete for membership, ther~e may be a genuine refo1naation 
of the union structure because workers will seek .membership within ~effective unions. 
Workers will be attJacted to powerful unions which can deliver in a country where workers 
can no longer depend on the state for the basic protections, and where the law no longer 
limits the subject mauer of bargaining. 
Bargaining units and 'labour mar·ket nex·ibility 
The teun "industrial" union under the old Industrial Relations .Act was a misnomer. 
'The Woollen Workers Union is not an industrial union but shares the wooDen industry 
with a number of occupationally based unions. The ·C.Ierical Union was considered an 
industrial union, but in fact its membership is occupationally based and works in a wide 
range of industries from the automotive industry to the woollen industry. Similarly, the 
Building Trades Union is ~composed of various ·tradesmen, and is a multi-occupationally 
based union. Its membership is engag.ed in a range of industries. For example, a 
carpenter may be employed in general construction, or in the maintenance of a .meat or 
wool processing plant. Ther~e is not a union for all work~ers in a single plant A 
manufacturer may have 15 or 16 individual unions within his plant Nor are there 
industry unions in the sense of a single union for a particular industry, like for example a 
United Autoworkers Union. A number of ~employer organisations have argued that plant, 
or industry-wide unions are bargaining partners which would allow for greater flexibility 
betw~een companies and industries in the sense of accommodating the economic 
~circumstances of the individual company or industry. However, the Labour Relations Act 
does nothing to change the present structulie of the union mov~ement from its occupational 
or multi-occupational basis, and in fact .may promote a further development of the union 
on a basis which embraces an even greater diversity of occupations. 
Under the previous Act the objectives of a registered union were to protect and further 
the interests of work~ers within a :~ific industry or related industries. The Act restricted 
registration to a single "industry" (occupation) with limited exceptions where the 
~Govemor-·General could dec'lare specific industries to be related to one another for the 
11urposes of registration. 'There ar~e no such restrictions under the new legislation. St.fong 
unions ·will not be company or industry based, but will add to their present multi-
occupational structure a diversity of occupations. Allowing competition between unions 
does not address the pfoblem of appropriate bargaining units. The reshaping of unions 
through competition, amalgamation, and federation or association, is likely to create 
unions who choose bargaining units no more susceptible to economic rationalisation than 
the bargaining units which are presently the subject of employer criticism. 
In tet1ns of wage flexibility derived from plant bargaining, the provisions of the Act 
.actually provide a disincentive insofar as the union must be cautious in ~endeavouring to 
negotiate agreements with individual employers separate from the award. Under the new 
Act the union must make up its ·m.ind whether an industry-wide award shall have 
application to an ~employer., or to directly bargain with the employer over the tenus and 
conditions to apply to the ~employers enterprise. Unlike the previous system where a 
contract of employment could be effected by both an award and a second-tier agreement 
pertaining to his individual ~employer, the contract of ~employment ~can be affected by only 
one collective agreement An ~employer can be exempted from the award for the purpose 
of affecting an individual agreement in either of two ways. Firstly, the employer can be 
••• 
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cited out of the award at the commencement of award proceedings. The award is then 
settled separately, and the union negotiates directly with the employer. The union has the 
right to strike over the award, and if the employer is cited out, the union retains the right 
to strike over the individual agreement 
The second way in which the union can negotiat~e a separate agreement is to approach 
the employer during the duration of the agreement. If the employer is willing, an 
agreement can be achieved. However if the employer resists, the union cannot legally 
strike. By endeavouring to negotiate after the award is settled the union gives up its 
bargaining power. By citing out the employer before an award settlement, the union 
retains bargaining power, but takes a specific risk. The union becomes committed to a 
truly deregulated labour market. Once cited out, the employer can refuse to negotiate. If 
the union cannot force the employer's capitulation, then no collective agreement applies to 
the employees. Further, the union cannot regain coverage under the award unless 
agfeement is feached with the employer that his workers should be covered by the award. 
If no agreement applies, then the unqualified preference clause does not apply. Workers 
then have the full freedom to choose whether they wish to be or not to be a member of the 
union. The employer can ~effectively refuse to recognise the union as a bargaining agent. 
(The one ~exception would be that the Labour Relations Act establishes the right of the 
union to represent its membership in personal grievances even if they are not covered by 
an awaro or collective agreement.) 
The new legislation does provide for composite negotiations where several unions may 
negotiate with a single employer, or industry. The Act is designed to encourage this type 
of bargaining in that bargaining on a composite basis does not exclude the unions from 
award cov~erage if their negotiations fail. However, these provisions existed under the 
previous system, and fesulted only in a few composite agreements, notably in lhe motor 
assembly industry and on large, remote construction sites. If past history is an indication 
then nothing in the new legislation suggests a general move to composite bargaining 
within the individual work place, and there are disincentives for individual unions to 
negotiate with the individual employer. 
The government has stated that its intentions ,ar,e to strengthen the union movement so 
that it can survive what would be an ~even :mor~e hostile environment if the present 
opposition were to become government. The ai·m is to create larger and more effective 
unions. Under the new legislation unions will require a m~embership of at least 1000 to 
retain registration under the Act. This aspect of the legislation in fact removes the 
possibility of plant unions with the vast majority of small N~ew Zealand employers 
employing less than 1000 workers. Plant or industry-wide unions do not appear on the 
gov~emment's agenda. If the union movement responds to the potentials created by the 
Act, the national award system may in the future be held together by the bargaining power 
of a smaller number of mor~e powerful unions of a multi-occupational basis. But this 
~change is likely to reinforce relativity rather than create greater wage flexibility. 
~Occupationally based awards saddle different industries with varying capacities to pay. 
Negotiations t~end to ~concentrate on comparisons of occupations because economic 
concerns differ significantly between industries, making the accommodation of any one 
industry difficult 
Uniformity during the 87/88 " 'age round? 
'The compulsory arbitration system provided for the clear expression of what was once 
New Zealand ~egalitarian philosophy by imposing a remarkable unifounity in wages and 
conditions within the national award syste:m. One would anticipate under free ~collective 
bargaining a gr~eat~er variation in settlements than under compulsory arbitration. The 
uniformity of the last wage round is difficult to explain. Perhaps this r~elates to the 
cultural values of the bargainers, but the explanation is likely to be more concrete than the 
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flagging spirit of our national egal italian ism. A mor~e concrete ~explanation relat~es to the 
occupational basis of the awards.. A labour relations manager for a large manufacturing 
plant may well act as a negotiator in several national award negotiations, and if not 
fot1nally nominated as a negotiator on the conciliation council, the labour relations 
manag~er will be an observer and participate in employer deliberations over other key 
negotiations. 
His company will have a similar union r~epresentation to other companies. Each 
manufacturer represented at the negotiations will have a number of national awards 
applying at their plant. National awards will be accommodated by at least three different 
arrangements. Firstly, some manufacturers will simply pay award rates. Secondly, some 
manufacturers will pay a set margin above award rntes. Thirdly, some manufacturers will 
pay new employees the award rate, but increase rates of pay after a period when the worker 
proves satisfactory. Most pay structures within the industry will key off the award 
movements, but will have additional increments which reflect the labour market 
conditions in the area. 
While employers may des.i re the flexibility to make adjustments that reflect the 
different ~circumstances between companies., the same flexibility for intra-company 
adjustm~ents between different sets of workers is not as practical. Employees make clear 
and highly charged comparisons to other employees within their own company. Wage and 
salary systems endeavour to provide a rationale that employees view as fair. Job 
evaluation is generally weighted £or equity considerations, whereas market forces deteinaine 
rates on the basis of supply and demand, rather than skill, effort and responsibility. If a 
concession ensures the continuing viability of the company, workers might w~ear a 3 
percent increase when a neighbouring company has granted 6. However, granting 6 
percent to drivers and 3 percent to storepersons within the same company has serious 
implications for moral and in-plant industrial relations, and is likely to precipitate action 
by store workers to regain parity. U n:iformity in national award settle.ments is therefor~e 
desirable from the in-plant wage and salary administration perspective. This is because the 
award settlements generally affect the base of the in-plant wage ,and salary administration 
structure of the individual company. 
Negotiators will strongly resist claims in the ancillary drivers award which exceed 
those granted to storepersons. ~on the other hand employers n1ay grant an increase to 
clerical workers which ~equates to the storeperson's increase., even when the clerical workers 
do not have sufficient bargaining pow~ers to gain the general incr~ease granted to 
storeworkers. The general emphasis in bargaining will not be towards variability, but to 
set a low and consistent general :movement applying to key awards within the individual 
enterprise, and 'Which affect the base of the in-plant or enterprise wage and salary structure. 
The simple reason ~or wage unifonn:ity in the last wag~e round is that the employ~ers do not 
desire wage flexibility within the award structure, and the balance of bargaining power is 
at present tipped in the ~employers direction. The flexibility 'that some employers want is 
an inter-company flexibility, and the new system neither provides for company unions nor 
requires occupationally based unions to bargain on a company basis. 
Future trends and wage flexibHity 
If the deregulation of the labour felations system had been more complete, company or 
plant bargaining units could be arrived at because union recognition and the bargaining 
unit, itself, would be negotiable items. The bargaining power of the employer would be a 
detet .aninant in deciding whether his company would be party to a plant, as opposed to an 
industry-wide, union. However, the Labour Relations Act is not designed to promote 
plant or company bargaining. Conciliation remains compulsory with unions registered 
under the Act, and 'therefore union recognition is not an item for bargaining. The 
employer might persuade the union to cite the company out of the award, but the 
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employer does not have the right to refuse to be party to the award. There~ore the 
etnployer must both recognise the union for the purposes of bargaining, and be party to an 
industry-wide bargaining unit. .According to a recent decision of the Labour Court, the 
employer does not have bargaining rights with respect to the type of bargaining unit even 
if his workers desire a separate agreement against the wishes of the union (Finnigan, D. in 
.Meat Workers Union v "'entec Corp Ltd.). Nor can the workers break away from the 
union to form a plant union and thereby change the bargaining unit. Nor can the 
employees of a single employer decide they do not wish to be in the union. While union 
employ.ment preference may be rejected, the vote is taken on an industry-·wide basis, and 
not a company basis. The Act simply prohibits these types of adjustments. Unions have 
retained the power to cite all employers within an industry and to negotiate on an industry 
basis. These provisions of the Act encourage a continuation of occupationaHy based 
industry awards which give impetus to wage uni:fo1 anity. 
While wage unifonnity has been the trend since the lifting of the wage freeze, there 
have been a few exceptions. In the Building Industry an industry allowance has been 
granted which represents an additional margin. The margin has been passed on to some 
awards which have application in the building industry, but the margin has not been 
reflected in other awards which hav,e had traditional relationships to the Building Trades 
Award, but which do not apply to the building industry. The Building Trades Labourers 
have picked up the industry alJowance, but the industry allowance has not followed on to 
the General Metal Trades Award where there has been a link between the carpenter and 
fitter. However, the allowance has been reflected in the H·eating and Ventilating Award to 
which the Engineers Union is a party., and which applies to the building industry. 
Similarly, the allowance has been reflected in the Electrical Contractors Award, but not 
the Maintenance Electricians Award. Therefore, certain engineering and ,electrical 
tradesmen employed in the Building Industry have received additional increments 
pertaining to the Building Industry, whereas maintenance electricians and ~engineering 
tradesmen have not feceivcd the additional incre:ment. Maintenance tradesmen have been 
constrained to accept the general increase detennined by the ailing manufacturing sector. 
Negotiating a series of awards applying to a single industry and not between industries 
might be a first step to composite bargaining which some employers view as a more 
positive commitment to wage flexibility. However, the extra movement in the multiple 
award arrangement has not been because the unions seek general wage mobility .. Unions 
will not wish to attach themselves to a composite agreement which lags behind or 
provides for downward movements in \vages and conditions. 
Giv~en that the occupational structure of unions is not altered by the Act, given that 
unions detennine what bargaining units they enter into, and given that the economy is not 
buoyant, the short term prospects of a more highly flexible wage system are not 
encouraging. The pressure will continue Lo constrain initial settlements and to retain 
relativity by virtue of handing out the same percentage increase to each union without the 
power to effectively buck the system. The trade-off is likely to be the maintenance of the 
national award structure in exchange for modest increases in the overall structure. For the 
near future such a trade-off may well suit the economic plight of the country. In ·the 
.medium teun the balance of bargaining power will inevitably shift. ·workers wiU be 
attracted to strong unions which can deliver, and the structure of the union movem,ent wiH 
alter lhrough competition between unions. In the long tenn a corresponding shift wiH 
subsequently ~evolve in the national award structure, but this change of award structure is 
unlikely to represent greater wage flexibility between companies. As long as 
occupationally based awards saddle employers and industries with varying economic 
fortunes, the collective bargaining systen1 will not account for the capacity of the 
individual employer or industry to pay. 
